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Half	   a	   century	   ago	   Marshall	   McLuhan	   proclaimed	   that	   “the	   medium	   is	   the	  
message”.	  Media	  affect	  our	  minds	  more	  profoundly	  than	  any	  of	  the	  messages	  sent	  
across,	  he	  suggested,	  so	  that	  new	  media	  may	  even	  make	  for	  new	  kinds	  of	  minds.	  
McLuhan’s	   idea	  has	  had	   little	   impact	  on	  cognitive	  psychology	  and	  philosophy	  of	  
mind,	   which	   have	   largely	   stuck	   to	   conventional	   wisdom.	   Now	   it	   is	   time	   for	   a	  
reappraisal.	  
	   Conventional	   wisdom	   on	   mind	   and	   media	   sees	   the	   conscious	   mind	   as	   a	  
private	  workspace	   for	   coining	   and	   processing	  mental	   contents	   (beliefs,	   desires,	  
feelings),	  prior	  to	  any	  expression	  of	  these	  in	  public	  media	  (speech,	  writing,	  print,	  
graphics).	  The	  mental	  content	  management	  system	  (CMS)	  is	  considered	  largely	  a	  
natural	   affair,	   whereas	   handling	   media-­‐borne	   expressions	   relies	   on	   culturally	  
acquired	   technologies	   such	   as	   coding	   conventions.	   Even	   assuming	   that	   mental	  
operations	   are	   conducted	   in	   a	   language	   of	   thought,	   how	   the	   mind	   works	   is	  
supposed	  to	  be	  largely	  independent	  of	  changing	  media	  landscapes.	  
	   I	  shall	  argue	  that	  the	  standard	  view	  suffers	  from	  a	  form	  of	  media	  myopia	  by	  
systematically	  neglecting	  the	  impact	  that	  subsequent	  new	  media	  have	  had	  on	  the	  
organization	  of	  conscious	  mental	  activity.	  	  
	   One	  way	   to	  dispute	   the	   standard	  view	   is	  by	   considering	   the	  Extended	  Mind	  
hypothesis	   (Clark	   2008).	   If	   parts	   of	   our	   cognitive	   capacities	   are	   outsourced	   to	  
external	   tools	   and	   technologies	   (e.g.,	   a	   notebook	   serving	   as	   extended	  memory),	  
then	   part	   of	   the	   (extended)	  mind	   becomes	   contingent	   upon	   the	  media	   used	   for	  
storing	   and	   processing	   the	   information.	   New	  media	   will	   almost	   trivially	   spawn	  
new	  types	  of	  mind.	  Taking	  this	  line	  one	  step	  further,	  I	  argue	  that	  media	  make	  their	  
mark	   on	   the	   intracranial	   mind	   as	   well:	   both	   the	   mental	   CMS	   and	   the	   items	   it	  
works	   on	   (i.e.,	   the	   contents	   of	   conscious	   experience)	   are	   contingent	   upon	  
historically	  changing	  media.	  
	   First	   I	   argue	   that	   the	   standard	   view	   entails	   a	   form	   of	   essentialism	   that	   is	  
neither	   desirable	   nor	  warranted.	   In	   an	   evolutionary	   and	   archaeological	   context	  
the	   essentialist	   bias	   incites	   a	   Flintstones	   fallacy	   with	   regard	   to	   earlier	   minds.	  
Moreover,	  essentialism	  is	  not	  warranted	  by	  the	  evidence	  supporting	  our	  current	  
view	   of	   the	  mind	   (roughly,	   current	   folk	   psychology).	   If	   current	   folk	   psychology	  
serves	   as	   the	   basis	   for	   modeling	   current	   mental	   processes,	   then	   parity	   of	  
reasoning	   requires	   that	   deviant	   folk	   psychologies	   should	   count	   as	   evidence	   for	  
different	  types	  of	  mind	  (cf.	  Sleutels	  2006).	  
	   The	  notion	  of	  folk	  psychology	  required	  by	  the	  previous	  argument	  is	  practical	  
rather	  than	  theoretical,	  and	  normative	  rather	  than	  descriptive.	  For	  this	  purpose	  I	  
introduce	   the	   notion	   of	   a	   community’s	   ‘epistemic	   practice’	   (analogous	   to	   Hutto	  
2008)	  or	  its	  ‘epistemic	  toolkit’,	  i.e.	  the	  collection	  of	  practical	  and	  conceptual	  tools	  
that	   community	   members	   use	   for	   purposes	   of	   describing,	   organizing,	   and	  
communicating	  their	  mental	  contents.	  This	  toolkit,	  I	  argue,	  is	  largely	  constitutive	  
of	  the	  mind’s	  CMS	  as	  well	  as	  of	  its	  consciously	  accessible	  contents.	  	  
	   To	   illustrate	   my	   point	   I	   discuss	   examples	   of	   changing	   epistemic	   practices	  
closely	   tied	   to	   historical	   transitions	   in	   the	   media-­‐landscape.	   These	   include	   the	  
development	   of	   dialectical	   and	  mnemonic	   techniques	   (cf.	   Carruthers	  1990),	   late	  
medieval	   hermeneutics	   (cf.	   Olson	   1994),	   Renaissance	   educational	   reform	   (Ong	  
1958),	   and	   the	   invention	   of	   systems	   for	   rational	   manipulation	   of	   context-­‐free	  
contents	   often	   associated	  with	   printing-­‐press	   and	   Enlightenment.	   Each	   of	   these	  
has	  left	  its	  mark	  on	  the	  mental	  organization	  as	  we	  know	  it	  from	  daily	  experience.	  
If	  we	   are	   now	  Gutenborgs	   (the	   cyborg’s	   printing	   equivalent)	  we	  may	  well	   have	  
been	   systematically	   misreading	   our	   ancestors’	   minds.	   What	   is	   more,	   our	  
children’s	   minds	   may	   be	   rapidly	   developing	   into	   something	   different	   yet,	   with	  
baffling	  consequences	  for	  mutual	  understanding,	  but	  also	  with	  great	  promise	  for	  
consciousness	  studies.	  
	   I	   conclude	  with	   some	   thoughts	   on	   how	   this	   approach	   connects	  with	   recent	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